IE pwns SecondLife - bah. I've always had something against fancy URL handlers that also inherit parameters from the calls. The problem is - why should an application trust a URL? If a call is made via a URL, the program should always classify this as untrusted and never initiate an activity that could potentially be dangerous without informing the user. The culprit here is -autologin in SecondLife - it shouldn't work in this situation at all. The browsers should of course also check the data (and Mozilla's reaction is correct, that Firefox was fixed accordingly when the problem also appeared there), but the real problem lies with the Second Life client.
Archive 17. September 2007
Ozbus, London to Sydney Bus Travel - Bus route. London-Sydney.
Tor-Server-Betreiber stellt nach Razzia Anonymisierungsserver ab - the biggest danger when using Tor or similar techniques: the technical ignorance of the authorities. They simply don't know what the stuff is and how they should react (taking the tor server would not have helped either, but would at least be logically justifiable). And of course the possibility for the authorities to intimidate people into stopping - which I do not want to imply here, I really just see the ignorance of the deciding official here. Tor is just exotic. For operators of such systems, however, this is part of the necessary risk assessment - you often and "gladly" encounter ignorance.